

## SECRET

## DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Security Committee

6 June 1984

Chairman  SUBJECT: Prepublication Review Project Report (U)  1. Attached is a "for the record" report by the Director of Information Services, CIA regarding the review of almost 500 publications in an effort to assist the NSC Staff in establishing a nexus between the absence of prepublication review requirements and unauthorized disclosures. In the midst of the project, the NSC Staff agreed to shift the effort to a survey of the number of disclosures which were averted through prepublication review. This latter effort was reported to Mr. deGraffenreid by SECOM-D-029 dated 13 February 1984. (C)  2. Most of the disclosures uncovered by the OIS/CIA task force, while damaging, could not be considered disastrous. The most important conclusions in report appear in subparagraphs 5c and 5d. These essentially say that prepublication review has little to do with leaks, per se, and that prepublication review is a valuable way to prevent inadvertent disclosures, if it is uniformly applied at all levels. The conclusion in 5c is most important, because it recognizes that leakers will not be deterred by prepublication review agreements. The leaker is never identified by the publisher and leaking is a covert activity in the truest sense—it is not attributable. (S)  3. The primary lesson to be learned from the report is that, while we should continue to support prepublication review, we cannot consider it a way to deter or detect the perpetrators of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence. (C)	MEMORANDUM FOR:	Deputy Director, Intelliger	ıce	Community Staff			
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4. The report is furnished for your information. Also attached is a copy of a memorandum transmitting the OIS report to Mr. de Graffenreid, at	
whose request the review was begun.	25X1
Attachment:	
A. Report from D/IS	
B. Memo to DeGraffenreid	

cc: C/Publications Review Board, CIA, w/atts C/UDIS/SECOM, w/atts CIA Member, SECOM, w/atts D/Information Services, CIA, w/att B A

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